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Abstract: This paper examines the dynamics trade-off financial structure in presence of ownership 
dispersion of newly created firms. Our objective is to test empirically the relevance of trade-off 
theory regards the debt funding behavior of business start-up. We use a sample of 200 business 
start-ups and the GMM panel data estimation over the period 2006-2010.  
 We find that ownership dispersion, tangibility and profitability lead to more debts funding. In 
addition, we prove that the adjustment to the ratio is moderating and that the necessary transaction 
costs are high for startups. Ownership dispersion leads to more liquidity and accelerates 
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1. Introduction  
 
Prior research has explored the capital structure decisions of large, well-established 
publicly-traded firms. The Trade-off theory is so judged to be inconvenient in the context of 
business start-up, (Cassar, 2004, Cotei and Farhat, 2017) due the high probability of failure. López-
Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) point out that SMEs aim to achieve an optimal debt ratio.  
Although the fundamentals are different, the Trade-off theory agrees that certain specific factors 
such as profitability and growth opportunities define the capital structure. The main studies on the 
capital structure of business start-up are limited to test the pecking order theory but what about the 
role of the trade –off theory?   
Ownership concentration and managerial equity holdings were supposed to lead to better 
firm performance by ensuring better monitoring and increasing managerial effort for large firms 
but what about business start-up? This managerial entrenchment1 could it explain the financial 
behavior of business start-up?  
In fact, recent empirical studies in corporate governance show the prevalence of firms with 
a dominant shareholder (Paligorova and Xu, 2012). Nevertheless, multiple owners could signal 
more initial funding that lead to more debt funding in case of newly created firms. Studies 
suggested that debt is positively related to managers’ equity ownership (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Berger and al., 1997), while other empirical studies have argued for a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and debt levels. Then, our second motivation of research is to investigate the 
relationship between ownership concentration and corporate debt levels for business start-up.  
We address the following controversial issue: how the trade off theory from its static and 
dynamic version provides the best predictions as regards the borrowing behavior of business start-
up in presence of ownership concentration/dispersion? We examine the main determinants of 
corporate leverage strategy in presence of multiple or few owners (short-term as well as medium 
and long-term debt) upon a sample of 200 business start-up drawn from the PSED database over 
the period 2006-2010. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 designs the assumptions related 
to trade off theory. Section 3 describes the key variables selected in order to test these assumptions. 
Section 4 presents the sample and descriptive statistics; it sketches the theoretical model and 
econometric techniques, and discusses the outcomes. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.          Hypotheses 
 
Under the Trade-off theory, several studies support the existence of a target ratio. The 
trade-off theory predicts that startup firms use less debt due to high probability of failure. The 
trade-off theory argues that firms will evaluate the benefits and costs of having debt, and will 
therefore find an optimal balancing between debt and equity in order to maximize the value of the 
company through the financial structure (Damodaran, 1999). 
However, with the market imperfection problems, firms are not immediately and 
completely converged to a target ratio. Thus some studies suggest the introduction of adjustment 
costs as an explanatory factor of financial behavior.  
Number of academic papers is specifically focus on Trade-off theory of debt financing in 
business start-up. Although there are two existing literatures: Coleman, Cotei and Farhat (2014)1 
demonstrate the firm characteristics such as growth, tangibility, as well as owner characteristics such 
 
1 Weisbach (1988): "Managerial entrenchment occurs when managers gain so much power that they are able to use the firm to 
further their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders." 
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work experience, education level and ethnicity can explain the debt equity decisions in the startup 
year. Drobetz and Wanzenried (2007) also test tangibility, growth and profitability as determinants 
of the capital structure and they also apply dynamic panel estimation using GMM. 
Adair and Adasku, (2015) test 2370 French SMEs over the period 2002–2010. They conclude that 
neither tradeoff nor POT validates all the variables explaining capital structure and there is no 
general theory thereof. 
The static version of the Trade-off theory suggests the existence of an optimal capital 
structure. Others researchers demonstrated that the Trade-off theory is not profitable for young 
firms, Mac an Bhaird, (2010). Static trade-off includes the tax benefits of leverage and bankruptcy 
costs. Young firms have less tax benefits which are associated with more debt use, (Day and al., 
1983). The second component of the trade-off theory is the bankruptcy cost. In fact, “young firms are 
more failure prone than older ones”, Cressy, (2006). Nevertheless, bankruptcy costs are insufficient for 
proving the negative association between risk and leverage, Poutziouri and al, (1999). Entrepreneur 
is more interested with debts than its tax benefits. 
Taking into account the speed and the cost of adjustment, «The Dynamic Trade-off 
Theory» is developed, Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, (1989). Dynamic trade-off theory proposes 
that firms may deviate from their target capital structure but they will exhibit an adjustment 
behavior towards that target. Indeed, the adjustment for existing firms is proving to be rapid in 
some markets such as Spain (De Miguel and Pindado 2001) and America (Flannery and Rangan 
2006), slower on others, such as Swiss (Gaud,2002) and France (Kremp et al 1999) and very slow 
on emerging markets (Haas and Peeters 2006). What about business start-up? 
Vanaker and Manigart, (2010) found that profitable businesses prefer to finance 
investments with retained earnings, even if they have unused debt capacity. External equity is 
particularly important for unprofitable businesses with high debt levels. New equity issues are 
particularly important to allow high-growth businesses to grow beyond their debt capacity. 
Bolton and al, (2013), analyze a model of optimal capital structure and liquidity choice 
based on a dynamic tradeoff theory for financially constrained firms. In addition to the classical 
tradeoff between the expected tax advantages of debt financing and bankruptcy costs, they 
introduce a cost of external financing for the firm, which generates a precautionary demand for 
cash and an optimal retained earnings policy for the firm.  Due to debt servicing cost financially 
constrained firms choose to limit their debt usages in order to preserve their cash holdings. And 
they choose not to exhaust its risk-free debt capacity. Interest payments may help shield earnings 
from corporate taxation, but they potentially induce costly external financing. 
Lopez and Garcia,(2008) find that SMEs follow a funding source hierarchy (pecking order 
model), and that greater trust is placed in SMEs that aim to reach target or optimum leverage 
(trade-off model). This remains true even when SMEs take a long time to reach this level, due to 
the high transaction costs they have to face. 
Several papers recognize that the level of private information is higher in firms with a concentrated 
ownership structure. More recently, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) and Becker and al. (2008) 
provide similar results in the presence of large shareholders, illustrating a higher degree of adverse 
selection due to informed traders but what about business start-up? 
             Nevertheless, the presence of multiple shareholders beyond the largest one may enhance 
information production. Cotei and Farhat, (2017) found that owner rely less on personal equity and 
theirs contribution is from retained earnings. 
 To estimate the target level of indebtedness, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) and 
Danbolt and Bevan (2000) analyze the dynamics of the capital structure of British firms for the 
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period 1991 to 1997. They give off a strong relationship between debt and four variables namely: 
the level of growth opportunities, profitability and variable asset structure. 
Hubert and Latrous, (2012) use a sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market 
over the period 1998-2009. Their results support an inverted U-shape relationship between 
shareholders' ownership and leverage.  
According to Dyck and Zingales (2004) or Laporta et al. (1997, 2002), the potential for 
private benefits extraction by the controlling shareholders increases the cost of finance. In this 
context, several papers report that other large shareholders reduce the potential for wealth 
diversion monitoring (Maury and Pajuste (2005). Accordingly, firms with single large shareholders 
or firms with majority shareholders are more likely to incur higher costs of external finance than 
firms with no majority shareholders or firms with multiple shareholders. Indeed, a recent paper by 
Attig et al. (2008) provides direct empirical evidence on this relationship. They report that firms 
with multiple large shareholders beyond the ultimate owner incur lower costs of external finance 
compared to firms with a single controlling shareholder. In light of these results, we expect 
concentrated ownership of business start-up incur high costs of adjustments.  
Market imperfections in information asymmetry as in the context of business start-up lead 
to costs and adjustment constraints. Such firms do not fully converge to long-term debt ratios and 
they follow a partial adjustment model towards values targets. 
Recently, the existence of a partial adjustment dynamic behavior at endogenously 
determined debt target is also highlighted on the UK market by Ozkan (2001) and on the Spanish 
market by De Miguel and Pindado (2001). Banerjee and al,  (2000) studied a dynamic model of 
capital structure in which they release the assumption that the companies have reached a target and 
maintain optimal level of debt, and consider that they may depart of their target. These authors 
worked on a sample of 122 British firms in 1990-1996 and 438 US firms over the period 1989-
1996. For UK firms, the speed of adjustment is very slow, even when firms are far away from their 
target. They then conclude small sized firms seem to adjust quickly to their target than large firms. 
Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) propose a dynamic model of capital structure and integrate 
debt agency costs and equity as determinants of the cost of financing. They find that the agency 
costs increase with the degree of asset specificity. Vilasuso and Minkler, (2001) conclude that 
agency costs and the degree of asset specificity are significant determinants of the capital structure 
of the firm.  
Farhat, (2016) studies the way business start-up are funding their operations over time. By 
using Kauffman Firm Survey data, the largest longitudinal data set comprised of all U.S. startups 
launched in 2004. Simultaneously, he examines whether the pecking-order and the trade-off 
theories explain the changes in capital structure of startups from inception to the later stages of 
development. At the startup stage, entrepreneurs rely on initial insider capital sources, such as 
personal savings, financing offered by friends and family, quasi-equity, and personal debt. Over 
time, the proportion of business debt and trade credit financing in the total capital injection 
increases significantly.  
Our main objective is to test the relevance of the trade-off theory in explaining the 
financial behavior of business start-ups in presence of ownership concentration/dispersion. To do 
this, we follow the methodology of Gaud and Jani (2002).While the former is static order, the 
second is a dynamic model incorporating variable cost adjustment to see how far we can speak of a 
speed of adjustment enabling companies to get closer to their target ratio. First, we present our 
sample and the explained and explanatory variables. Second, we identify hypotheses and the 
specification which ends with a presentation and interpretation of results. 
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2.1.          Economic profitability 
 
In a context of information asymmetry, the most profitable firms have more cash which 
give off a negative relationship between profitability and debt. Firm’s profitability will be negatively 
related to the expected financial distress costs. Since the probability that firms with higher and 
more stable profits will enter bankruptcy would be lower.This description is confirmed by several 
empirical results (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 1999; and 
Booth et al 2001). A profitable firm has a preference for debt because the interest is deductible 
from taxable income. Moreover, if past profitability is a good approximation of future profitability, 
a very profitable business will be more likely to repay its debt, (Shyam, Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
The static theory therefore predicts a positive relationship between leverage and profitability. This 
prediction is the great contradiction of the Trade-off model. 
Our first hypothesis presents itself as follows:  
 
H1: Economic profitability is positively related to debt. 
 
Several approaches are used to measure the profitability. We measure the profitability 
(RENTABILITY) by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes on total assets (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995 and Booth et al, 2001). 
 
2.2.           Growth opportunities 
 
Asset growth reflects the funding requirements resulting from the financial policy of the 
firm. Growth opportunities, lead to funding problem. From the perspective of agency theory and 
according to Myers (1977), agency costs between shareholders and creditors will be even higher 
than the value of future growth opportunities is more important compared to the present value of 
assets in place. We expect a negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities. 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2003) suggest that the negative effect of MTB debt ratio 
is partly due to the negative relationship between growth opportunities and target ratio. Based on 
theoretical considerations and the results found by the majority of empirical work, we make the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Growth opportunity is negatively correlated to debts funding of business start-up 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) the Market to Book ratio (MTB) is frequently used as a measure 
of growth options. Other measures have been used as marketing expenses, research and 
development and capital expenditures (Titman and Wessels 1988). We chose the ratio changes in 
capital as a measure of the variable growth opportunities. 
 
2.3.           Asset structure 
 
Tangible assets have an impact on the level of debt because they are less subject to 
information asymmetries and lose in the event of liquidation, less value than intangible assets. They 
therefore offer more guarantees to creditors. Under the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and creditors, Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that over-investment problem is less 
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serious when the firm has a significant share of tangible assets in its assets. Consistent with this 
prediction, we assume that: 
 
H3: Debts should be positively correlated with asset tangibility for business start-up. 
 
The net tangible assets ratio over total assets in stocks was selected as a measure of asset 
structure (TANGIBILITY). This measure was also adopted by Kremp and al (1999). 
 
2.4.          Ownership concentration 
 
The agency cost hypothesis of capital structure accepts the existence of optimal capital 
structure like static trade-off hypothesis. But it argues that optimal capital structure is obtained as 
the solution of the firm’s minimizing the interest conflict between shareholders and debt holders, 
the principle-agent cost. Since financial decision-making is strictly influenced by the ownership 
structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) we include a variable of number of owners. 
 
H4: Ownership dispersion leads to more debts funding 
 
3.           Data 
 
We study the financial behavior of business start-up under the trade-off theory and 
ownership dispersion. First, we conduct a regression of leverage on rentability, growth, asset 
tangibility and owners in a static model by using the generalized method of moment, studying the 
fixed and the random effect. Then, we study the same model under a dynamic adjustment.  
Our sample consists of 200 business start-ups from the PSED (panel study of 
entrepreneurial dynamics) database. We can distinguish between different activities (retail stores, 
restaurant, services, health, education, manufacturing, construction, communication, and finance, 
insurance). Retail stores and services constitute the majority share of 55% of all.  
The measure of debt leverage (long-term debt + average current bank loans / total assets). 
As discussed by Titman ad Wessel’s (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991), the choice of 
explanatory variables of debt is not easy. In your study, we use five main variables approved in the 
literature are: Profitability, growth opportunities and asset structure and ownership 
concentration/dispersion).  
Descriptive statistics show that in mean our sample of business start-up has a leverage ratio of 
24.3% and are under-levered due to financial crisis. In mean there are two additional owners 
besides the entrepreneur and so there is a moderated dispersed ownership. 
 
Insert Appendix 3 here 
3.2.            Results 
 
We present the static model of the trade-off theory and the dynamic model. 
 
3.2.1.          Dynamic Trade-off Financing Behaviour 
 
Dynamic trade-off models can also be used to consider the option values embedded in 
deferring leverage decisions to the next period. Goldstein et al. (2001) observe that a firm with low 
leverage today has the subsequent option to increase leverage. Under their assumptions, the option 
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to increase leverage in the future serves to reduce the otherwise optimal level of leverage today. 
Strebulaev (2007) analyzed a model quite similar to that of Fischer et al. (1989) and Goldstein et al. 
(2001). Our linear regression model follow the model of Rajan and Zingales (1995): 
 
Leverage it = α0 + α 1 G
’
it + Ct + it    (M3) 
leverageit: endogenous variable, which represents the ratio of total financial debt of the 
company i for the period t; 
G’it: is a raw vector of conventional variables used in Rajan and Zingales (1995) that include 
tangibility of assets (TANGIBILITY), profitability (RENTABILITY), and growth opportunities 
(GROWTH); 
Ct : A set of control variables in number of owners and initial liquidity; 
it :  error term. 
According to Dynamic Trade-off Theory, firms have long run target leverage and adjust the 
gap between actual and target leverage each year. We retain a partial adjustment model of capital 
structure (Flannery and Rangan (2006)): 
 
leverageit = (1-δ) leverageit-1+ α 1 G
’
it + Ct+ it             (M4) 
 
The adjustment speed of leverage (δ) is bounded between zero and one. When is near one 
of these boundaries, it goes rapidly adjusted to the long run target leverage and is near zero, the 
adjustment is few.  
The speed of adjustment is the percentage of the deviation from the target that the firm 
removes each period. In estimating the speed of adjustment, the implicit assumption is that the 
speed of adjustment is homogenous across firms (Fama & French 2002; Flannery & Rangan 2006; 
Ozkan 2001). This assumption is however inconsistent with the argument of the dynamic trade-off 
theory which posits that different costs of deviation and different costs of adjustments should 
result in different estimations for the speed of adjustment. Few recent papers indicate that no single 
estimated speed of adjustment can fit all firms. 
Using panel data, Banjeree, Heshmati and Wihlborg (2004) and Lööf (2005) apply a 
nonlinear, least square methodology to estimate the parameters in a setup similar to ours in model. 
However, this methodology leads to biased and inconsistent estimators because error terms tend to 
be correlated with lagged leverage, LEVERAGEit-1. 
In order to avoid this problem, we apply the dynamic panel data and Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM). They prove that estimation provides consistent parameter estimates by 
utilizing instruments that can be obtained from orthogonality conditions. Concerning the 
instruments, we report the Sargan statistic, which tests the over-identifying restrictions. Table 2 
present the different regression result of dynamic model 
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
In dynamic regressions, our results show expressive conclusions for the lagged dependent 
variable (LEVERAGEt-1). This variable focuses on the costs of adjustment. In the entrepreneurial 
context the speed of adjustment is low.  
Our results point to the proportion of owner’s equity in total capital injections increase 
over time.  
Startup that have two to five owners tends to inject equity that contributes to more debt 
funding. 
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The variables OWNERS is significant at 10% level. Under this result, we confirm the 
hypothesis H4, under which a dispersed ownership structure of business start-up lead to more 
debts funding for services activities. Nevertheless, ownership dispersion leads to agency 
problems. Mahrt-Smith, (2005) suggested that firms that need to have dispersed ownership. 
Ellul (2008) argued that various owner categories could impact a firm’s financing decisions 
in different ways. James and al, (2002), use a sample of 1708 small corporations and find that 
agency costs are significantly higher when an outsider, rather than an insider manages the firm. We 
conclude that ownership dispersion have a positive effect on the speed of adjustment to debt 
ratio.The variable (GROWTH) is negatively and insignificantly correlated with leverage. Hypothesis 
H2 is confirmed. 
Asset growth reflects the funding requirements resulting from the financial policy of the 
firm.   
Rentability is negatively correlated with leverage at 5% level. The profitable firms have 
more cash, this give off a negative relationship between profitability and debt. The hypothesis H1 is 
retained this confirm the trade-off in start-up firms within a dynamic model.  
Asset tangibility is always positive and significantly related to debt level and we retain 
hypothesis H3. 
Under the dynamic model, the adjustment coefficient is relatively low. The importance of 
this factor is checked in the estimator of Arellano and Bond. According to these results, it appears 
that for start-up, adjustment to the ratio is slow and that the necessary transaction costs are high. 
Given the governance role played by banks.  
Therefore, the low adjustment cost is due to the efficiency of the quality control exercised 
by banks.  
Thus, and according to the results of studies of Fama and French (2002), the speed of 
adjustment to the target ratio is relatively low, and high levels of funding gaps are always associated 
with higher levels of debt. 
 
3.2.2.         Trade-off financing behaviour: the static model 
 
The table 1 reports the results of estimating equation with GMM, fixed effect and random 
effect panel data estimator. Overall, the variables explain a significant part of the debt level of our 
sample firms.  
Insert Table1 here 
The R2 vary from 3% to 54% depending on the estimators. The Haussmann test is not significant 
and leads to favor retaining the model specifying random effects. 
In view of the regression results, the explanatory power of the model are made using the GMM is 
relatively low (R2 = 0.032).   Of all the variables introduced, the number of owners and tangibility 
and rentability are significant at 10% level. The tangibility is always positively correlated with 
leverage, and all coefficients are significant at the 5% level of significance.  
This result supports the prediction of the trade-off theory that the debt capacity increases with the 
proportion of tangible assets on the balance sheet. Under the GMM we retain H1, H3 and H4. 
Under the static model we retain the assumption supporting the trade-off dictating that more cash 
flow the firm has the more debt it will generate. 
Dispersed ownership leads to more debt funding. Financial distress facing business start-up of our 
example due to the choice of period study of financial crisis 2007 could explain more the legitimacy 
use of trade-off theory. Trade-off theory works well within firms that have room for growth and 
expansion. 
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The panel data analysis introducing specific fixed effect of each company in terms of debt, allowed 
us a change in the explanatory power of the model. The adjusted determination coefficient 
increased from 0.03 to 0.54.  In fact, rentability is positively related to leverage and significant at 
10%level. We retain then H1. 
H2 under which growth opportunity is negatively correlated to debts funding of business start-up is 
retained only in dynamic model do to some patterns of growth for services activity in dynamic 
model. 
Random effect analyses the heterogeneity between entrepreneurs. Tangibility and owners remain 
the main significant variables.  
We retain under the random effect that ownership concentration is positively related to debt 
funding and H4 under which ownership dispersion leads to more debts funding is rejected. 
 
5.        Conclusions 
 
The present study analyzes the power explication of the trade off theory in presence of 
ownership concentration in the context of business start-up.  
According to the first model, the results show that asset structure and ownership structure 
are the main predictors of the level of indebtedness of business start-up. The study use the specific 
fixed effects allowed us to improve the explanatory power of this model.  
According to the trade-off theory, highly profitable business with stable and tangible assets 
tend to have higher target gearing ratios as their assets are relatively safe.  
There is the limit of agency problems of dispersed ownership. Under the second model, there is a 
dynamic behavior in the start-up context.  This is consistent with the predictions of Fama and 
French (2002) and Shyam Sunder-and Myers (1999). According to this result, start-up firms adjust 
slowly to target ratio.  
Our results point to a significant financial growth pattern in the use of debt. Although the 
proportion of owner’s equity in total capital injections decreases over time, the annual balance of 
owner’s equity increases (suggesting that owners use retained earnings to increase their ownership 
stake in the firm). Firms owned by two or more owners tend to inject more equity (especially 
outside equity). 
In providing the aforementioned findings, we contribute to the current stream of literature 
in three important ways. First, our results provide insights into the use of the trade off theory in the 
static and dynamic model to explain the capital injections in startup businesses: the static trade off 
theory is not convenient and the dynamic trade off we find a slow adjustment cost to debt ratio. 
Ownership is positively correlated to debt funding in the dynamic model. 
Ownership structure could resolve this debt limits and have an effect on dynamic 
adjustment. 
Second, this article builds upon and contributes to the existing body of work carried out on 
small business financing in the startup year.  
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This table presents the key results of estimations of the static mode. It reports the results of estimating equation with GMM, fixed 
effect (heterogeneity between start-up) and random effect (heterogeneity of entrepreneur) panel data estimator for 200 business 
start-up for the period 2006-2010. 
 
































R2 0.032414 0.547692 0.032414 
Fischer Test 1.649883 0.851722 1.649883 
Prob (Fischer) 0.163273 0.789662 0.163273 
Haussman test   2.4123 
*** Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level  et * significant at 10% level 
 
Table 2 
This table displays results of estimations of the dynamic panel estimation (Arellano and Bond) for 200 business start-up. We use 
the lagged variable ‘LEVERAGE (-1)’ and so we demonstrate through the dynamic regression how leverage depends on the 
lagged dependent variable that effects the cost of adjustment. 
 
Dynamic panel  








TANGIBILITY 0.018714  
(2.159)*** 
Instrument Rank 6 
Sargan Test 1.792096 
*** Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level  et * significant at 10% level 
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Appendix I: Variables definition 
 
This table presents the different measures of dependent and independent variables. 
Variable Name Definition 
Total debt ratio (LEVERAGE) total liabilities/total assets 
Profitability (RENTABILITY) Return on asset: Earnings before interests and depreciation 
Tangibility of assets (TANGIBILITY)  Total fixed assets / Total assets 
Growth opportunities (GROWTH) Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 




Appendix II Descriptive statistics of variable 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
 
 LEVRAGE OWNERS RENTABILITE TANGIBILITY GROWTH 
 Mean  0.243122  1.717822  0.639295  10.19849  1.472202 
 Median  0.139553  2.000000  1.094905  10.00000  0.000000 
 Maximum  1.000000  5.000000  0.192  20.00000  3.60000 
 Minimum  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  1.609438 -1.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.313551  0.900292  1.573081  1.408404  1.438241 
 Observations  202  202  202  202  202 
 
 
Appendix III: Matrix Correlation 
This table presents the matrix correlation between the dependent and independent variables 
 
 LEVRAGE OWNERS RENTABILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH 
LEVRAGE  1.000000  0.109470 -0.051124  0.125563 -0.037174 
OWNERS  0.109470  1.000000 -0.044830 0.058171 -0.056113 
RENTABILITY 0.051124 0.044830  1.000000  0.010873 -0.004063 
TANGIBILITY  0.125563 -0.058171  0.010873  1.000000 -0.030745 
GROWTH -0.037174 -0.056113 -0.004063 -0.030745  1.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
